INTRODUCTION
This article considers the relationship between federal immigration enforcement and state criminal, post-conviction law. This relationship exemplifies certain inevitable complexities of preemption and federalism. The article's main premise is that perfect uniformity or complete preemption would be simplistic, ahistorical, and ultimately impossible. Two questions flow from this: First, whether (and, if so, how) state courts adjudicating rights should take account of such legitimate federal immigration law goals as uniformity and finality? 1 Second, how should federal courts deploy preemption and federalism principles when faced with challenges by federal authorities to such state court actions? This article offers a framework of "dialogical federalism." This is essentially a variant of "cooperative" or "dialectical" federalism that aims to normalize certain tensions under a rubric of dialogue rather than formal hierarchy or efficiency. 2 The framework takes account of the history, current norms, and structure of immigration enforcement, as well as the most relevant contemporary models of preemption and federalism. 3 It has long been axiomatic that federal law preempts conflicting state laws relating to immigration enforcement, even those that purport to "mirror" federal enforcement goals. [T] he Supreme Court has suggested that [the cooperative federalism model] best describes those instances in which a federal statute provides for state regulation or implementation to achieve federally proscribed policy goals."). 3 Or, as Heather Gerken has usefully pluralized, "federalisms." Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2012) ("It would be useful if federalism debates were more attentive to the fact that there are many federalisms, not one. . . . It would be useful if scholars were more attentive to the fact that the questions federalism raises need not involve an either/or answer. Often they will involve a both/and.").
Though the Court saw some aspects of immigration enforcement as "a harmonious whole," the system is better described as "a patchwork of overlapping and potentially conflicting authority." 8 This patchwork challenges doctrinal stability and clarity. Historically, some courts and scholars have tried to meet this challenge by 5 
Id.
6 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 727 (1893) (upholding federal deportation law that required Chinese noncitizens to produce a "credible white witness"). 7 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S. B. 1070) were preempted by federal law, but provisionally upholding a provision that allowed law enforcement to investigate a person's immigration status. "This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect . . ."); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 Ct. , 1973 Ct. , 1987 Ct. (2011 (upholding Arizona law that mandated revocation of business licenses for employers who hire undocumented workers); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law , 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1840 n.34 (1993) (noting that, though federal supremacy and strong preemption are well-accepted, this is neither "natural nor inevitable" as a feature of federalism). differentiating pure immigration law (i.e., the control of the entry and residence of noncitizens) from alienage law (which allows states to regulate the rights of noncitizens in various ways). 9 Such a dichotomy is workable for some purposes, as it defends the legitimacy of federal oversight of pieces of the patchwork. But it does not help us to differentiate legitimate state immigration enforcement (if there can be such) from that which should be preempted. 10 Uniformity is a powerful goal and a siren song in this realm. Indeed, uniformity has been praised in recent years both by those who oppose strenuous state immigration enforcement and by those who support it.
11
The ACLU amicus brief in Arizona v. United States approvingly recites that, "This Court has long recognized the special need, expressed in the Constitution, for uniformity and federal supremacy in the immigration area." 12 Similarly, the amicus brief written on behalf of Representative Lamar Smith, et al., argues that the Arizona legislation was "a multi-faceted effort to assist federal authorities in implementing several well-established federal policies: removing illegal aliens from the United States and eliminating incentives that cause many such aliens to seek to remain here." 13 This convergence could of course be explained instrumentally: Those who oppose such immigration enforcement support federal preemption when it seems in their ideological interest to do so. See, e.g., id. This is largely due to the multi-faceted nature of the state/federal relationship and the complexity of preemption and federalism doctrines.
relationship.
19
Let me be candid about the unavoidable problem of a normative baseline: This essay seeks a doctrinal model that comports with a critique of current federal enforcement as disproportionately harsh and violative of basic human rights.
20
The model proposed herein thus tends to support preemption in such situations as the "force-multipliers" attempted in Arizona, Alabama, etc., while counseling federal deference to state adjudications that protect basic rights in immigration enforcement settings. The obvious challenge is to justify this in a non-instrumentalist way.
21
This article begins with an examination of the basic principles governing federal preemption and federalism in immigration law. It then considers the history of the relationship between state criminal laws and federal deportation together with a more specific analysis of the most important recent case to navigate these waters: Padilla v. Kentucky. The article's proposed framework neither fully embraces nor completely condemns such oddities. Rather it seeks to explain why they exist and to explore possible hidden benefits to the apparent jurisprudential cacophony.
The essential conclusion is that state enforcement agents and state courts are deeply engaged in immigration-related processes. This engagement implicates normatively powerful sub-federal systems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analysis, etc. The best state court decisions balance autonomy, fidelity to state precedent, and protections of rights with some awareness of federal 23 I put this word in quotation marks intentionally, as some courts and commentators have seen retroactivity as an inapposite framework for the question of whether Padilla's norm were in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the case itself. See Christopher N. Lasch, Schuck, supra note 30, at 65-66 (noting that "[i]ndeed, it is hard to think of a national program (other than Social Security) that is run entirely by the federal government without any state involvement"). 35 Huntington, supra note 33, at 791-92. 36 Id. Huntington defines "pure" immigration law as "the rules governing the admission and removal of non-citizens." Id. at 791. 37 Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 570. See generally id. (noting that "the federal government primarily depends on states and their criminal justice systems to determine in the first instance whether lawfully present immigrants are criminals and therefore deportable under federal law."). Other such pathways-beyond the scope of this essay-include marriage, divorce, child custody, adoption, and SIJ adjudications in state courts. But see Lee, supra note 28, at 558 (noting that "Congress created an enforcement system that attaches immigration consequences to criminal convictions without formally empowering any party within the criminal courts to make immigrationrelated decisions" and suggesting ways to "accommodate this reality"); Peter H. prehensive immigration system must maintain primary federal control over removal standards as an integral organizational function without which "the system would be chaotic." 42 But, from the earliest crime-based United States federal exclusion and deportation statutes to the present, state, not federal, convictions have undergirded the vast majority of crime-based federal immigration enforcement actions, especially "post-entry social control" deportations. 43 Put simply, since the beginning of the modern deportation regime in the early twentieth century, vastly more people have been deported for violating state (and even local) criminal laws than for violating federal criminal law. 44 Thus, in many respects this "chaotic" model has long been the norm. 45 Indeed, as a central feature of immigration enforcement, it may not be chaotic at all, simply dynamic or multifaceted (or dialectical or dialogical). 46 Federalism, as Judith Resnik writes, "offers an analytic and a history of practices demonstrating the capacity to sustain toleration within polities of plural legal norms." 47 However, there is no area of domestic law where federalism would seem so weak-and where preemption is more powerfully implemented-than immigration enforcement. This is our basic dilemma.
And The Lost Cause Of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 668 (2008) (critiquing the distinction between post-conviction relief that is effective for eliminating grounds for deportation and relief that is not effective). 
44
See Lee supra note 28, at 576-77. 45 See id. at 578-79 (noting that "local prosecutors can manipulate a noncitizen's removability by adjusting the charges supporting a conviction-by plea bargaining 'creatively' with the noncitizen's lawyer."); see also Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 633 (describing as "chaotic" an immigration system in which the federal government does not maintain primary control over removal standards).
46
See infra Part II; see also Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 633 (describing as "chaotic" an immigration system in which the federal government does not maintain primary control over removal standards). 47 Resnik, supra note 21, at 364.
Federal preemption doctrine, in general, stems from the Supremacy Clause, 48 and the "fundamental principle of the Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state law." 49 In the immigration context, this has long been buttressed by notions of "plenary" federal power, resulting in rather binary and heavyhanded models. 50 Indeed, more than a half century ago, the Supreme Court noted that exclusive federal immigration power, "has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government." It has potential virtues of predictability, clarity, and uniformity. However, as Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff noted long ago, such paradigms (in which a predominant voice is sought) imply that "conflict and indeterminacy are dysfunctional." 54 This-to reiterate-is not the only way to view federalism in general. Nor is it the best way to view immigration federalism. As lower courts previously held, and as the Supreme Court explained in Arizona v. United States, federal immigration law is "extensive and complex." 56 As the Court noted, "the pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States."
57
Of course, state laws relating to immigration enforcement are routinely preempted if they conflict with federal law. 58 And "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case." 59 In the realm of criminal deportations, however, the two spheres of state and federal law simply have not been-and cannot realistically be-hermetically sealed from one another. 60 Thus, the "purpose" of Congress is contradictory: to achieve federal uniformity but also to incorporate and to rely upon state laws, adjudications, and norms.
It is thus unsurprising that, in upholding one of Arizona's initiatives, the Court noted that "[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system." 61 The recognition of such consultation legitimates dialogue between state courts and federal authorities. As an example, the Court imagined that "a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be unable to produce identification." 62 Arizona's Section 2(B) instructs state officers to make a "'reasonable' attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE." 63 However, the Court, signaling some deference, noted that "[t]he state courts may conclude that, unless the person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may 56 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. 57 Id. at 2500. 58 Particularly where the challenged state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 2501 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This has long been recognized as "a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510-11 (holding that § § 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S. B. 1070) were preempted by federal law, but upholding a provision that allowed law enforcement to investigate a person's immigration status). 61 Id. at 2496. 62 Id. at 2509. 63 Id.
be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong the stop for the immigration inquiry." 64 Indeed, the concluding paragraph of the Court's analysis of Section 2(B) explicitly awaits a "definitive interpretation from the state courts" with what amounts to a hint that state courts should try to avoid a construction that "creates a conflict with federal law." 65 Thus, the state courts must (or at least should) take federal law into account when ruling on the state law's scope. Conversely, federal courts should pay greater attention to-and be less inclined to broadly preempt-thoughtful rightsbased rulings by state courts even if they may impede federal uniformity.
Clearly, this is a model of dialogue, not dualism. Robert Schapiro has suggested that federalist dualism should be replaced by "polyphonic federalism," which "seeks to harness the interaction of state and national power to advance the goals associated with federalism." 66 This is clearly applicable to immigration law enforcement. 67 As Cover and Aleinikoff noted, once we reject both a "hierarchical imposition of federally determined values" and a "model of fragmentation, justifying value choices by the states," we can recognize that "conflict and indeterminacy" are not necessarily dysfunctional. ing force for the" more sophisticated and more legitimate "articulation of rights" that straddle the intertwined state criminal and federal immigration systems. 70 We should not ignore the difficulties of such dialogues. Any nuanced or subtle model of immigration federalism is hindered by the contentious state of contemporary debate. The stakes in boundary state/federal conflicts over immigration policies are high; the legal and policy debates are fierce. Litigation between Arizona and the United States over immigration enforcement was described by one prominent supporter of state power as "a battle of epic proportions . . . about a state's right to enforce the laws of this land and protect its citizens from those who break our laws." 71 On the other side, a leading immigrant rights advocate saw the Arizona lawsuit as a bulwark against mob rule.
72
The depth of conflict may be due in part to "partisan federalism," per Jessica Bulman-Pozen, in which "federalism provides the institutional terrain for disputes that are substantive in nature." 73 It may also be due to the influence of "restrictionist issue entrepreneurs" who target certain states and localities for political reasons, rather than due to real burdens created by alleged federal under-enforcement. 74 The Supreme Court, as noted, 70 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1048; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98, 240 (1962) (describing "passive virtues" that facilitate the conversation between courts and political actors). 'It is about a state's right to enforce the laws of this land and protect its citizens from those who break our laws.'"). 72 Id. ("'One of the reasons we have a judiciary is so that mobs don't rule, so that when the Legislature oversteps its bounds there is someone to stop them,' said Omar Jadwat of the A.C.L.U. Immigrants' Rights Project.").
73
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 14, at 1080 (noting that partisan federalism "involves political actors' use of state and federal governments in ways that articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the political parties, and the affective individual processes of state and national identification that accompany this dynamic."). ultimately recognized the inevitability of some state/federal overlaps. 75 Still, we are left with the muddle that some state legislation and some state adjudication relating to immigration enforcement may stand, though the federal government may expressly preempt any such efforts. Put another way, the complexity of immigration enforcement seems to demand federal acquiescence to certain state actions, in light not only of practicality and legitimate state interests, but also of federalism. But a credible framework has remained elusive. 76 To be sure, tension between state variability and autonomy and federal goals of uniformity is not new in this realm. Federal legislation, agency rules, and agency adjudication have episodically aimed to override state variation, but never with complete success. In 1959, for example, the Attorney General ruled that state expungements of narcotics offenses would have no effect on immigration proceedings. 77 In 1990, Congress eliminated the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) that had empowered state court judges to prevent the use of state convictions for deportation.
78
Most fundamentally, in 1996, Congress sought to standardize the federal definition of a "conviction" for immigration purposes. "solely related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration hardships," the conviction may still justify deportation.
81
But the BIA will defer to a state court's decision to vacate due to a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings. 82 Strangely, the BIA will also defer to state courts' resentencing of a non-citizen from a sentence of one year to three hundred and sixty days in order to avoid deportation consequences.
83
This essay suggests that these are not merely anomalous phenomena. Rather, they reflect the inevitably dialectical nature of federal immigration enforcement based on state criminal proceedings where basic rights are adjudicated.
This dialectic has survived federal courts' generally dismissive approach to challenges to federal overrides of state post-conviction remedies.
84
The definition of "conviction" for immigration purposes was, for a time, accepted as "a fluid one." Similarly, the Second Circuit found the BIA's tendency to ignore state post-conviction remedies to be "reasonable." 89 As the Second Circuit reasoned in the context of the use of a state "youthful offender" adjudication as a prior conviction in sentencing:
[T]he "principles of federalism and comity embodied in the full faith and credit statute," . . . are not endangered when a sentencing court, not questioning the propriety of the state's determination in any way, interprets how to apply New York's youthful offender adjudications to a Guidelines analysis.
90
The basic proposition is that "the federal sentencing court is neither refusing to recognize nor re-litigating the validity of [the defendant's] New York state judgment of conviction or his youthful offender sentence." This sort of "cooperative federalism" raises at least two distinct problems. First, state processes, even those based on state constitutional conceptions of justice and fairness, are rendered irrelevant even though Congress has expressly used state convictions as the prerequisite to many types of 89 Because it was "entirely consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the 1996 amendments to broaden the definition of conviction." Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2007) (the definition of conviction focuses on "the original attachment of guilt (which only a vacatur based on some procedural or substantive defect would call into question) and imposes uniformity on the enforcement of immigration laws."); see also deportation. 94 Second, it depends (to avoid double jeopardy and other constitutional problems) on the doctrine that deportation is merely a civil "collateral" consequence of state criminal convictions. But this doctrine has been challenged by Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that a noncitizen criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings not only as to the defense of the criminal case, but also as to advice about potential deportation consequences. 95 The historically blended system of immigration enforcement thus embodies inevitable deep tensions. See, e.g., Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (providing that, for purposes of the statute, a "conviction" is defined under the law of the jurisdiction where the proceedings were held).
of the states. 97 But many powers exercised by the states today involve "a bewilderingly complex system of federal-state relationships in which the states participate in programs enacted and largely funded by Washington." 98 The relationship between state criminal law-as informed by state constitutional adjudications-and federal immigration law, has aspects of both of these forms of federalism. Where federal enforcement depends upon state enforcement through the states' police powers, the old dictum becomes especially salient that "courts should assume that 'the historic police powers of the States' are not superseded 'unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. '" 99 Substantively, states are of course largely free to craft whatever criminal/constitutional norms they choose. However, there are deep overlaps between state criminal law and federal immigration law. State adjudicative autonomy is thus potentially in conflict with the fact that states operate under, and are obliged to respect, certain federal immigration policies and supervision. 100 It is thus clear that there has been a long and complex historical relationship among state post-conviction mechanisms, state constitutional norms, and federal immigration law. 101 Indeed, though sometimes seen as the quintessential example of an arena in which federal power is at its zenith, immigration enforcement well-illustrates 97 Schuck, supra note 31, at 66. ("That is, state authority inheres in the constitutional settlement among the states and the people, whereby only limited powers . . . were delegated to the national government while all other powers were reserved to the states and the people.") 98 Id.; see also Chin & Miller, supra note 30, at 255 ("Cooperative enforcement is a familiar idea throughout our federal system and a pervasive concept in American criminal justice."). Schuck, supra note 31, at 65; see also Schuck & Williams, supra note 41, at 420-421 (citing Pressman and Wildavsky's study on policy implementation in support of the proposition that the current removal system does not make sense). In the end, however, as Heather Gerken has noted, "[b]oth devolution and centralization are means to an end. They are, in fact, means to the same end: a wellfunctioning democracy." Gerken, supra note 21, at 1891. 
104
Expungement means either a statute that permits a deferred adjudication of a conviction (in which case a judgment is never entered), or a court vacation or setting aside of a judgment of conviction pursuant to a rehabilitative statute. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "[under a] 'vacatur' or 'set-aside' [statute], a formal judgment of conviction is entered after a finding of guilt, but then is erased after the defendant has served a period of probation or imprisonment and his conviction is ordered dismissed by the judge . . .
. [Under a] 'deferred adjudication'
[statute], no formal judgment of conviction or guilt is ever entered. Instead, after the defendant pleads or is found guilty, entry of conviction is deferred, and then during or after a period of good behavior, the charges are dismissed and the judge orders the defendant discharged. for example, the Attorney General's 1960 opinion that rendered state expungements inapplicable to narcotics cases. 105 As the Attorney General argued, "to follow the Board's view [allowing expungements to defeat deportation] would make the deportability of the alien depend upon the vagaries of state law."
106
The powerful goals of federal uniformity were summarized in his conclusion:
It is hardly to be supposed that Congress intended, in providing for the deportation of aliens convicted of narcotic violations, to extend preferential treatment to those convicted in the few jurisdictions, which, like California, provide for the expungement of a record of conviction upon the termination of probation.
107
After more than a century of evolution, most express reliance on state remedial measures has disappeared, and the norm of federal uniformity has clearly ascended. However, the legislative history of the 1996 federalization of the definition of conviction sheds virtually no light on whether congress even considered-let alone can be said to have had an opinion about-the viability of post-conviction state actions.
108
A brief historical look at some of these measures demonstrates why it may be impossible to completely achieve uniformity, even if Congress were to try. Id.
107
Id. Essentially, the JRAD allowed a state court sentencing judge to rule definitively against deportation, thereby trumping federal supremacy and preemption in practice. 110 For nearly a century, this was seen as legitimate, if not essential, for many reasons including efficiency, fairness, and federal deference to state power.
111
The JRAD was first crafted in 1917 as part of a rather comprehensive reorganization of United States immigration law.
112
Much of that reorganization involved the creation of bridges and relationships between state criminal laws and deportation.
113
These connections derived more from public perceptions than from strong empirical data about immigrant criminality. 114 Indeed, the highly influential Dillingham Commission began its 1911 report on immigration and crime by noting that "[n]o satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate to the increase in adult population." 115 Still, the Commission suggested that immigration had wrought certain changes in "the character of crime." 116 The report opined that there had been increases in certain types of violent crimes, certain "offenses against public policy" (i.e., "disorderly conduct, drunkenness, vagrancy" and "many offenses incident to city life") and, the Id. at 2. rather charmingly named, "offenses against chastity." 117 Indeed, the Commission specifically noted that Native American born offenders "exhibited in general a tendency to commit more serious crimes than did the immigrant." 118 Nevertheless, the Commission saw it as a "serious" and "inexcusable[] defect . . . that aliens admitted to this country . . . may pursue a criminal career without danger of deportation." 119 Thus, the Commission recommended that "provision should be made for ridding the United States of aliens who, within a relatively short time after arrival, become criminals." 120 The outer recommended limit was the period of naturalization, lasting typically five years.
121
The Immigration Act of 1917 contained a provision that provided for the deportation of various noncitizens who were convicted of certain types of crimes (particularly crimes "involving moral turpitude" and prostitution-related offenses) after their admission to the United States. 122 State convictions were absolutely central to this model. The bitter aspects of state criminal processes were, so to speak, ameliorated by the sweet. The 1917 law thus created the JRAD and further stated that the deportation of "aliens" convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned. 123 Thus, when the system of federal removal was first 117 Id.
118
Id. at 167. (2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing created, states were empowered not only to create federal deportations but to avoid them as well.
There was a deep logic to this that is worth recalling. The history of the JRAD shows considerable recognition that the state court sentencing judge was in the best position to determine whether the sanction of deportation should be added to the criminal sanctions.
124
When JRADs were invoked, they could be powerful discretionary modes of relief from deportation. JRADs, for moral turpitude convictions, bound the (former) INS. 125 Though INS retained authority to deport on other grounds, many types of offenses were deemed crimes of moral turpitude so the potential reach of a JRAD was significant. 126 Moreover, it is apparent that state court judges (and prosecutors and defense attorneys) were acutely aware of the deportation sanction. This leads not only to concern about it, but to ever-changing attempts to become involved with it. However, as Margaret Taysentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from the United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section. lor and Ronald Wright have noted, the original congressional linkage between deportation and sentencing remained an unfinished project.
127
A main reason for this was the venerable doctrine that deportation has long been formalistically viewed as a civil sanction, not criminal punishment. 128 Also, in practice, the possibility of a JRAD did not always come to the attention of sentencing judges. 129 Still, the very idea of the JRAD put considerable pressure on the doctrine that deportation was merely a civil, collateral consequence of state criminal convictions. Indeed, some non-citizens claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys had misadvised them about the JRAD option.
130
Courts are divided on whether this could warrant reopening a guilty plea.
131
The JRAD also empowered state judges, who, in turn, could apply state and even local norms to the federal deportation system.
132
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in its 1986 decision in Janvier v. United States, 133 the JRAD was seen by some courts as "part of the sentencing process, a critical stage of the prosecution to which the Sixth Amendment safeguards are applicable." 134 Indeed, the Janvier court saw deportation as inextricably linked to the underlying crime and therefore, subject to the sentencing discretion of the state court judge "who best knew the facts" and who may have thought that "the drastic penalty of deportation was unwarranted." 
See Janvier, 793 F.2d at 453 (concluding that JRADs were "designed to make the total penalty for the crime less harsh and less severe when deportation would appear to be unjust"). 133 Id.
134
Taylor & Wright, supra note 124, at 1146 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1986)). 135 
Id.
part of immigration law until its repeal in 1990.
136
A House committee offered a strong volte-face from the 1917 model:
Because the Committee is convinced that it is improper to allow a court that has never passed on the immigration related issues involved in an alien's case to pass binding judgment on whether the alien should be deported, section 1504 states that judicial recommendations will no longer protect aliens from deportation . . . .
137
This assertion of a technocratic norm (with implicit nods to strong federal preemption) thus dovetailed with a substantial hardening of deportation laws in this era, which reached its apotheosis in 1996.
138
The elimination of the JRAD did not initially spawn much pivotal judicial reaction. The repeal inspired some constitutional challenges. 139 The statute said that repeal took effect immediately and applied "to convictions entered before, on, or after" the date of enactment. 140 Some contended that this violated the ex post facto clause. 141 Courts, however, generally rejected such claims. More recently, though, the elimination of the JRAD loomed notably large in the Supreme Court's majority decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.
143
As Justice Stevens' opinion recounted, the removal of the JRAD, together with certain harsh changes enacted by Congress in 1996, had rendered removal "practically inevitable" if a noncitizen "has committed a removable offense." 144 These changes to immigration law "dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction," thus, highlighting the importance of "accurate legal advice" regarding deportation consequences in state court criminal proceedings.
145
In addition to its powerful implications for our understanding of the juridical nature of deportation itself (i.e., as punishment or not), Padilla illuminates the inherent tension discussed above between state and federal actors. Like the JRAD of old, Padilla's norms straddle goals of federal supremacy and uniformity and state autonomy. This becomes especially interesting when such norms derive from state constitutions or declarations of rights. Indeed, even the BIA-in its major opinion interpreting federal uniformity in the meaning of a conviction-deferred to some state determinations including: "where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a state court on direct appeal, wherein the court determines that vacation of the conviction is warranted on the merits, or on grounds relating to a violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal proceedings."
146
The Attorney General later reiterated this interpretation, concluding that the federal 143 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-64. 144 Id.
145
Id. at 364. This approach has largely stood the test of time.
148
The essential rule now is that state post-conviction relief that is granted, so to speak, "on the merits," will effectively bind federal authorities and will prevent deportation. 149 If, however, a state court acts pursuant to a rehabilitative statute or a state expungement mechanism, its action is likely to be ignored by federal immigration authorities.
150
The most basic reason for this distinction was offered by the Attorney General in Matter of Marroquin: state laws that authorize the subsequent expungement of a conviction "typically do so for reasons that are entirely unrelated to the legal propriety of the underlying judgment of conviction."
151
These reasons, in other words, do not relate to "the factual basis for, or the procedural validity of, the conviction."
152
When considering specific state statutes abstractly this rule seems passably clear. But in practice, there has been much variation. It turns out to be no simple matter to determine whether state action is ameliorative.
153
Case law varies substantively and procedurally, including who has the burden on the critical question. 154 gubernatorial pardon is not rendered conditional due to the words "to prevent deportation."). One cannot cite this body of case law as a stellar example of uniformity. 155 Also, when we deal with state judicial determinations under such standards as "the interest of justice" the doctrinal picture starts to look particularly murky.
156
For state judges, consideration of federal goals and possible preemption may affect, limit, impede, or even (in rare cases) expand the protection of rights in certain state constitutional adjudications. 157 This prompts variants of the questions posed in this article's introduction. Should state judges consider federal goals at all in these sorts of cases? If so, how, and how much? For federal judges, conversely, awareness of the venerable and inevitable nature of this porosity should refine analyses of federal supremacy and preemption in immigration enforcement law. But how? In both cases, the legislative trends are clear. The realm of "post-conviction relief" from removal has moved from "a presumption of full faith and credit with a few limited exceptions such as narcotics" to a rule that is virtually limited to state adjudications based on an "underlying defect in the criminal conviction." Contrary to the Kentucky Supreme Court (and others), such advice was not "categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel" even though deportation is still nominally a civil sanction.
162
As I have previously recounted, there is a lot packaged within this line of reasoning, especially as to the constitutional understanding of deportation. "Justice Stevens's majority opinion cannot fully be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of deportation to the realm of civil collateral consequences . . . ." 163 Indeed, Justice Stevens spoke at the conference for which this article was written. I had the opportunity to ask him whether he thought we had reached a point where at least some forms of deportation should be considered "punishment" for constitutional purposes. His refreshingly simple and candid answer: "Yes."
Though the Padilla opinion was groundbreaking in many respects, its recognition of a duty of criminal defense counsel to advise about deportation was not a new idea for many states.
164
A general right to effective assistance of counsel has long been mandated by some state constitutions. 165 Moreover, state courts have repeatedly recognized that application of the standards announced in Strickland inevitably involved nuanced applications of state norms. 166 This had 162 Id. at 366. sometimes, pre-Padilla, included a specific right to advice about immigration consequences, though courts were generally tentative to go quite that far.
167
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted in People v. Pozo that the justices were not "prepared to state in absolute terms," that an attorney had a duty "to advise an alien client of the possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea." 168 However, the application of "an objective standard of reasonable conduct" led them to conclude that the lower court's "underlying concern over counsel's failure to engage in rudimentary legal investigation [was] compelling." 169 This duty, said the Colorado court, did not stem from a duty to advise specifically about deportation consequences, but rather "from the more fundamental principle that attorneys must inform themselves of material legal principles that may significantly impact the particular circumstances of their clients."
170
The important point for our purposes is that there was long decisional history about related issues in states pre-Padilla. Justice Stevens's majority opinion referred to this history many times, as did innumerable amici. 171 However, one of the dissenters in Pozo, Justice Rovira, highlighted two major recurring problems: finality and complexity. Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice. 176 Clearly, one way to read Padilla is as a rejection of this concern as a general matter in favor of a more robust regime of rights protection to be jointly (dialogically) implemented by state and federal courts.
The same is true for the problem of complexity, which was strongly considered by Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts) in Padilla.
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They accepted a duty not to "unreasonably" provide incorrect advice. 178 However, beyond that, they saw only a duty Pozo, 746 P.2d at 533 (Rovira, J., dissenting) (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784 (1979)). It may come as a surprise to some readers to consider how Justice Stevens viewed such questions early in his career. His dissent began with the proposition that, "[f]undamental fairness may require discussion of certain important consequences in specific cases, but a rigid rule that makes a guilty plea vulnerable whenever a trial judge fails to supplement counsel's advice with an enumeration of all significant consequences of the plea is neither necessary to the maintenance of civilized standards of procedure nor desirable." United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He then continued, "[t]he 'consequences' of the plea of guilty which relate to voluntariness, and therefore have constitutional significance, are consequences of the plea rather than consequences of the conviction. . . . The consequences of conviction have a different significance. They relate to the wisdom of a decision to plead guilty rather than to the voluntariness of the decision. A variety of factors enter into the exercise of judgment which produces that decision. Among them are counsel's appraisal of the likelihood of a successful defense, the admissibility of critical items of evidence, the question whether the accused can conscientiously make a false denial of guilt, the opprobrium that may result from a public trial, an estimate of the sentence which the judge may impose, and the chance of probation or parole. An erroneous appraisal of any of those factors affects the wisdom of the plea, but does not make it involuntary." Id. at 530. Justice Stevens also noted that " [ '" 197 Since Chaidez, the calculus for some state courts has changed. Some courts, highlighting uniformity and finality, have simply deferred to the federal system. 198 For example, in Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Supreme Court expressly rejected petitioners' argument that "the state's interest in fairness and due process protections weighs more heavily than uniformity with the federal standard." 199 Rather, the Court offered an extended argument that Padilla was a "new rule" and that Chaidez, therefore, was correctly decided. 200 The Connecticut Court also noted that "the state's interest in fairness and due process protections must be balanced against the importance of the finality of convictions." The SJC thus saw "an important distinction between the existence of a Federal substantive right or remedy, the contours of which are fixed by Federal law, and the procedural availability of such a right, the scope of which may be set by State law." 205 Based on this authority to conduct an independent review, the SJC did not see itself as required "to blindly follow that court's view of what constitutes a new rule." 206 As the Maryland Supreme Court had boldly asserted, "[e]ven if the Supreme Court ever were to hold that Padilla is not retroactive under Teague, that holding would have no adverse effect on our analysis here." 207 This seems exactly right as a model for proactive dialogical federalism. The state court, operating in a rights-protecting mode, is applying its own norms. It does this with awareness of-but without excessive deference to-federal models of retroactivity or concerns about uniformity.
Similar examples of state court autonomy arise around the problem of proving "prejudice." 208 Padilla, as noted, applied the twopart test of Strickland. 209 This demands proof, first, that trial counsel's performance failed to meet "prevailing professional norms" and, second, that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant. 210 This latter prong, according to some courts, requires state courts to assess whether a defendant "might rationally be more concerned with removal than with a term of imprisonment." 211 the important implication here: Such an inquiry clearly demands some understanding and application of immigration law, both abstractly and as likely to be applied by federal authorities. A New York appellate court concluded, for example, that "the strength of the People's evidence, the potential sentence, and the effect of prior convictions" must be weighed against a variety of immigration law factors, including, for example, whether, "an alien has significant ties to his or her country of origin, or has only resided in the United States for a relatively brief period of time, or has no family here." 212 In such cases, "a decision to proceed to trial in lieu of a favorable plea agreement may be irrational in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and a potentially lengthy prison sentence." However, for a long-term lawful permanent resident, the calculus might well be different. 214 Conversely, some state courts focus almost exclusively on the sentence, rather than on the removal. 215 Even those courts that applied the prejudice prong this strictly, however, cannot avoid at least some inquiry into immigration law, per the logic of Padilla. point is what Heather Gerken has termed "the power of the servant." 221 States exercise power in cooperative regimes, as federal "servants," not as separate sovereigns. 222 As administrators of the federal regime, states often have a great deal of discretion in carrying out federal policies in "the nooks and crannies of the administrative system." 223 Power of this type looks more like that "wield[ed] . . . [by] . . . a street-level bureaucrat" than that exercised by a separate and autonomous government. 224 Thus, state power depends on "integration and interdependence." 225 This model accounts for much real-world state power in immigration enforcement. However, viewing state courts applying state criminal and state constitutional norms as merely servants in "a complex amalgam of state and local actors who administer national policy" undervalues both state normativity and state historical authority. 226 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has adopted substantial aspects of the Padilla opinion and made them central to its own state constitutional analysis. While one may (as I do) applaud this approach, it requires some defense. The best defense is this: It is clear from Arizona v. United States that State action related to immigration enforcement may neither expressly conflict with federal enforcement priorities nor may it contravene fundamental constitutional rights. This is why the Court only tentatively upheld Arizona's SB 1070, Section 2(B). 227 Constitutional conformity requires state enforcement agents and state courts to be deeply engaged in immigration-related processes. But they often must do so in the context of historically powerful sub-federal systems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analysis, etc. Thus, the best state court decisions balance autonomy, fidelity to state precedent, and protections of rights with awareness of federal concerns. There is no precise formula, but nuanced state court adjudications should help federal 221
